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Arguably one of the most powerful governmental institutions in
the world,' the Federal Reserve System (the Fed) controls U.S. mone-
t B.A., The University of Texas at Austin, 2010; J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School,
2013; Articles Editor, Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, Volume 22. First and foremost,
I thank my family and friends for their unending love and support through life and law
school, without which I would be lost. I am also very grateful to Professor Odette Lienau,
whose guidance was invaluable in the research and drafting of this Note. Finally, I am
deeply indebted to Saad Rizwan, Alison Carrizales, Meredith Carpenter, and all other
members of the Cornell Law Review for their tireless work and insightful edits.
1 See, e.g., 1 AL.AN H. MELTZER, A HIsTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 1 (2003) (noting
that the United States underwent an "enormous shift in political and economic power"
during the twentieth century and that the Federal Reserve System "is now [its] powerful
central bank"); William Greider, Dismantling the Temple: How to Fix the Federal Reserve, NA-
TION, Aug. 3, 2009, at 11, 11 (arguing that the Fed is a powerful organization as demon-
strated by the fact that it has distributed "trillions of dollars to banks, financial markets and
commercial interests" during the recent financial crisis without presidential or congres-
sional authorization to print this money).
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tary policy, "supervis[es] and regulat[es]" domestic banking institu-
tions, and provides "financial services" to the U.S. government and
foreign institutions,2 all with the ostensible tripartite goal of achieving
"maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term inter-
est rates."3 Since its creation by the Federal Reserve Act on December
23, 1913,4 the Fed has been a source of controversy in the American
polity and continues to supply political ammunition to partisans to-
day.5 The methods by which the Fed achieves its tripartite goal, rather
than the goal itself, generate much of the debate surrounding the
institution.6
Most recently, critics of the Fed point to its role in the financial
collapse of 2008 as evidence of the flawed nature and methods of this
modem institution.7 These critics often fall into one of two opposi-
tional groups:8 the first group advocates disestablishing the Fed and
replacing it with market mechanisms;9 the second group advocates
augmenting the Fed by adding democratic mechanisms to its opera-
tions.10 While Fed policies certainly did contribute to the 2008 cri-
2 See Mission, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov/
aboutthefed/mission.htm (last updated Nov. 6, 2009).
3 See 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2006); Mission, supra note 2.
4 Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.); MELTZER, supra note 1, at 65.
5 See, e.g., MELTZER, supra note 1, at 73-81 (detailing the "contentious" and "political"
decisions that had to be made immediately after the Fed's inception); Paul Krugman, Op-
Ed., G.O.P. Monetary Madness, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2011, at A43.
6 SeeJOHN T. WOOLLEY, MONETARY PoLITICs: THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE POLITICS
OF MONETARY POLICY 105-06 (1984) ("[Plolicy making increasingly has been dominated by
... specialists who blur previously stable lines of political division and complicate policy
debate ... . The conflict between democratic control and domination by technical experts
has been a long-standing source of tension in the case of the Federal Reserve.").
7 See, e.g., Lawrence H. White, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Central Bankers?, 30 CATO
J. 451, 451-52 (2010) (criticizing the Fed for not applying the rule of law in response to
the 2008 crash); Greider, supra note 1, at 13 (calling the Fed a "co-author" of the recent
economic crisis and arguing that the Fed "failed in its most basic function-moderating
the expansion of credit to keep it in balance with economic growth"); Peter J. Boettke &
Daniel J. Smith, Monetary Policy and the Quest for Robust Political Economy 1-2, 31-32
(Mar. 29, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1720682 (calling for application of the concept of "robust political
economy" to the Fed and arguing that institutional change to the Fed is necessary in order
to apply the concept of political economy).
8 Of course, some people would advocate maintaining the current structure of the
Fed, but rebuttal of their arguments falls outside the scope of this Note, which is primarily
concerned with solving the problem. For an introduction to their arguments, see William
J. McDonough, An Independent Central Bank in a Democratic Country: The Federal Reserve Experi-
ence, FRBNY Q. REV., Spring 1994, at 1, 4-6 (defending the structure and supervision of the
Fed and arguing that such structure and supervision allow the Fed "to meet its monetary
policy responsibilities and contain or forestall crises").
9 See, e.g., White, supra note 7, at 460-61 (promoting constraint of the Fed and argu-
ing that "doing without a central bank" would be the "ultimate restraint on central
banking").
10 See, e.g., Greider, supra note 1, at 13-15.
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sis, 11 the solution to this problem is neither the institution's wholesale
privatization nor its conversion to a democratically beholden adminis-
trative agency.
Indeed, both of these solutions engender significant negative ex-
ternalities that substantially outweigh their benefits in addressing the
Fed's problems. Privatization is defective as a solution because it
would vest monetary policy in an institution (the market) whose sole
motivation is profit.12 Generalizing the tripartite goal mentioned
above to the minimization of human suffering demonstrates that
profit motivation,13 while sometimes aligned with that goal, is often
independent of or even contrary to it.14 Likewise, democratization as
a solution is defective because it would eliminate the efficacy of Fed
actions by vesting monetary policy in the legislative branch, which
lacks the expertise, efficiency, and political independence required to
prescribe effective monetary policy in response to macroeconomic
trends.15
In sum, the United States requires policy prescriptions that ad-
dress the Fed's problems but that lack the negative externalities of the
solutions discussed above. This Note proposes a solution, entitled the
"Neutral Road," that provides such a prescription. At its core, the
Neutral Road suggests that to function properly, the Fed must be in-
dependent of all undue influence from both the private and public
sectors. It proposes that the United States maintain the wall of separa-
tion between the Fed and the political landscape in order to maximize
the accuracy and value of the Fed's decision-making process, resulting
in sound policy results. It also suggests that the United States substan-
tially increase the potency of the veil that separates Fed decisions from
the private sector, thereby preventing the undue influence of large
private financial institutions over Fed policy and ensuring that such
policy complies with the Fed's tripartite goal.
To construct this argument, Part I of this Note asserts that the
Fed, by its nature, requires separation from both the political and pri-
11 See, e.g., Roger C. Altman, The Great Crash, 2008: A Geopolitical Setback for the West,
FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2009, at 2, 2-4 (suggesting that the Fed's decision to decrease the
federal funds rate to around one percent in 2001 and to maintain that level for three years
was one of the two "underlying causels]" leading to the 2008 financial crisis).
12 See generally Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Prof-
its, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32 (arguing that a private business's sole responsibil-
ity is to make a profit).
13 I employ "profit motivation" to indicate the incentives for businesses to maximize
revenues and minimize costs without consideration of other, perhaps incompatible, goals
such as social welfare. For further discussion on how profit motivation can be inconsistent
with social welfare for businesses, see generally Friedman, supra note 12, at 33 (arguing
that it is in the best interest of businesses to concern themselves solely with profits and
ignore "social responsibility").
14 See infra note 30.
15 See infra Part I.B.2.
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vate spheres of influence. In so arguing, Part I elaborates on the Fed's
operational problems and further examines the two oppositional
groups mentioned above. Part II provides an alternative solution, the
Neutral Road, which avoids the defects in the two oppositional
groups' positions. Part III proposes the means to achieve the Neutral
Road, including statutory changes, impermissible contact rules, mer-
itocracy, and transparency.
I
THE PROBLEM AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. The Problem
The problem with the Fed's operations lies in its haphazard ap-
proach to monetary policy, which the structure of the Fed's compo-
nents exacerbates. 16 Recent experience shows that the Fed's
components have significant private interests at their core and that
each of those interests exercises varying degrees of influence over ac-
tual Fed policy creation.17 As a result, Fed monetary policy does not
merely favor the private sector, but affirmatively benefits private actors
unequally.18
The central policy-making components of the Fed are the Board
of Governors, the Federal Open Market Committee, and the Federal
Reserve Banks.19 A piece-by-piece examination of this system's struc-
ture demonstrates the private sector's influence. The President nomi-
nates and the Senate confirms the members of the Board of
Governors,20 drawing a number of these members from the ranks of
private sector financial institutions.21 The Federal Open Market Com-
mittee consists of the members of the Board of Governors as well as
five representatives from the regional Federal Reserve Banks. 22 Each
of the governing boards of the regional banks consists of three bank-
16 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2006) (establishing the Fed's Board of Governors and
expressly commanding the President to have "due regard to a fair representation of the
financial, agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests" in nominating its member-
ship); id. § 263 (establishing the Federal Open Market Committee and defining its mem-
bership as the Board of Governors along with five representatives from the Federal Reserve
Banks).
17 See infra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., Greider, supra note 1, at 15 ("[Bankers] profit enormously from the pre-
sent system and share in the money-creation process. When the Fed injects more reserves
into the banking system, it automatically multiplies the banks' capacity to create money by
increasing their lending . . . .").
19 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 241, 263, 302.
20 Id. § 241.
21 See Board Members, BOARD GovERNoRs FED. REs. Sys., http://www.federalreserve.
gov/aboutthefed/bios/board/default.htm (last updated Sept. 5, 2012) (providing links to
biographies of current and past board members).
22 12 U.S.C. § 263(a).
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ers and six nonbankers drawn from nonbanking enterprise and the
public.23 "Primary dealers" are important private member banks that,
while subject to Fed policies, nonetheless consult with the institution's
governing bodies in crafting those policies. 24
Given this level of inclusion of the private sector (and especially
large financial institutions) in the Fed's decision-making process, it is
no wonder that the resulting policies often favor institutions that exer-
cise significant influence over Fed policy. 25 And while this structure
does not always give rise to policies contrary to those that would result
absent such influence-that is, policies in the best interest of the na-
tional economy-the structure has at least the capacity to do so. 26 It is
this structure that critics of the current system often point to in assert-
ing that reform is necessary for a fully functional monetary policy to
exist.27
B. Proposed Solutions
Critics often propose one of two solutions, each sourced from op-
posite ends of the American political spectrum. Each of these solu-
tions is problematic in its potential effects on the American
populace's economic welfare for different reasons, and each fails to
provide a solution that does more good than harm.
1. Privatization
The first of these two positions argues, in line with the American
political Right, that the Fed's failings demonstrate the institution's
failed mission as a more general matter, and that the United States
therefore ought to devolve the Fed's policy-making powers to the pri-
23 Id. § 302.
24 See, e.g., Primary Dealers List, FED. RES. BANK N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/
markets/pridealerscurrent.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2012) (describing how primary deal-
ers help the New York Fed implement monetary policy).
25 See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Fed in an $85 Billion Rescue of an Insurer Near Failure,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at Al (calling the Fed's bailout of AIG "the most radical inter-
vention in private business in the central bank's history"); Edmund L. Andrews, In Sweeping
Move, Fed Backs Buyout and Wall St. Loans: Bear Stearns Sold, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2008, at Al
(describing Fed approval and securing of a $30 billion credit line to facilitate the Bear
Stearns takeover and the Fed's commitment to lend money to the twenty large investment
banks designated "primary dealers"); Landon Thomas Jr., Run on Big Wall St. Bank Spurs
U.S.-Backed Rescue, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 15, 2008, at Al (describing Fed support ofJPMorgan's
plan to rescue Bear Stearns).
26 The private sector exercises influence over Fed policy making. See Thomas
Havrilesky, The Influence of the Federal Advisory Council on Monetary Policy, 22 J. MONEY CREDIT
& BANKING 37, 45-46 (1990) (concluding that private sector banking institutions had a
marked impact on Fed monetary policy making). The Fed then acts in ways that support
those private interests. See supra note 25.
27 See Greider, supra note 1, at 14-15 (calling for greater congressional supervision of
the Fed); Boettke & Smith, supra note 7, at 31-32 (arguing for institutional change in
order to apply the concept of robust political economy to the Fed).
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vate sector.28 This sort of privatization would in effect place U.S. mon-
etary policy-making power with the large financial institutions that
now act as mere participants in the Fed's governance system-namely,
the private banks.29 These entities, whose central motivation is profit,
would then have control over an important governmental tool that
should be employed to maximize the American populace's welfare.
While maximizing profit and increasing the general welfare are not
always diametrically opposed motivations, they often substantially
diverge.30
The most visible component of the privatization proposal would
be private control over the money supply-that is, the disestablish-
ment of government-issued currency.3' Even ignoring the transaction
costs associated with the multiple nonuniform currencies that this pol-
icy would create,32 the proposal's drawbacks substantially outweigh its
benefits. Indeed, allowing the money supply to depend on the will of
the banks, which are subject to market forces and their attendant
risks,33 injects significant risk into a system that cannot afford instabil-
ity.34 The recent financial collapse demonstrates the need for stabil-
28 See generally White, supra note 7, at 451-52, 459-62 (arguing for a Fed consistent
with the rule of law, resulting in significant limitations of the Fed's power). This proposal,
while drastic, is not as extreme a position in the American political landscape as it may
seem. Indeed, several prominent members of Congress, including former presidential
candidate Ron Paul, advocate for abolition of the Fed. See Kristina Peterson, Who Will Pick
Up Ron Paul's Role of Chief Fed Critic?, WALL ST. J. BLOC (July 3, 2012, 2:22 PM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/economics/201 2 /0 7 /03/whowill-pick-up-ron-pauls-role-of-chief-fed-critic/
(distinguishing Ron Paul for his strong opposition to the Fed's existence and naming
other vocal, conservative-leaning critics of the Fed). Additionally, several state Republican
platforms expressly support repeal of the Federal Reserve Act. See, e.g., 2012 REPUBLICAN
PARTY OF TEX., REPORT OF PLATFORM COMMITTEE 20 (2012), available at http://
s3 .amazonaws.com/texasgop-pre/assets/original/201 2PlatformFinal.pdf; IDAHO
REPUBLICAN PARTY, IDAHO REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 3 (2012), available at http://idgop.org/
wp-content/uploads/2012/03/2012-Idaho-GOP-Platform.pdf; NEV. REPUBLCAN PARTY,
2012-2014 NEVADA REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM (2012), available at http://
www.nevadagop.org/about-the-gop/2010-platform/.
29 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
30 The widespread exploitation of lower wages and minimum working conditions in
the developing world easily demonstrates that profit motivation can diverge significantly
from improving human welfare. See generally ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOP-
MENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD (Sherry B. Ortner et al. eds.,
1995) (discussing this phenomenon).
31 See, e.g., Milton Friedman & AnnaJ. Schwartz, Has Government Any Role in Money?,
17 J. MONETARY ECON. 37, 51-52 (1986).
32 See generally Allan Borodin et al., On the Competitive Theory and Practice of Portfolio
Selection (Extended Abstract), in LATIN 2000: THEORETICAL INFORMATIcs 173 (Gast6n H. Gon-
net et al. eds., 2000) (acknowledging that trading in different countries involves transac-
tion costs (i.e., spreads)).
33 For an example of the risks that attend the profit motivation associated with market
forces and the results of those risks, see William Poole, Causes and Consequences of the Finan-
cial Crisis of 2007-2009, 33 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 421, 424-26 (2010).
34 See INT'L MONETARY FUND, UNITED STATES: FINANCIAL SYSTEM STABILITY ASSESSMENT
passim (2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10247.pdf.
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ity, as the American banking industry's high-risk lending practices
under profit-maximizing incentives contributed to the collapse.35
Similarly, where banks supply money, they will, as creditors, be moti-
vated to restrict their issuance of currency so as to prevent any and all
inflation, which is bad for creditors and good for debtors.3 6 During
boom periods, when demand for money is high, a bank would act
overly conservatively in supplying private currency in order to maxi-
mize profits from its role as creditor. The Fed's motivation is key to
the difference in institutional suitability here: because the Fed's moti-
vation lies in maximizing the economic welfare of the American peo-
ple in the long run, rather than maximizing its own profits in the
short run,37 it is better situated to exercise control over the supply of
money than are banks.
The disestablishment of government-issued currency is merely
one example in which a profit-motivated monetary policy could create
policy results inferior to those created under an ideal-motivated re-
gime, but that example demonstrates the significance of the two re-
gimes' potential divergence. Because of situations such as these, the
vesting of monetary policy making-or even mere components of that
power-purely in the private sector implicates a cost that no attendant
benefit can overcome.
2. Democratization
The second position-that in line with the American political
Left-advocates an increase in democratic control over the Fed's op-
erations. 38 The proposals that advocate such "democratiz[ation]" of
the Fed vary in scope and structure, but in general seek to vest in-
creased oversight of the Fed and control over monetary policy in Con-
gress and its ancillary institutions.39 Such vesting could in theory
35 See Poole, supra note 33, at 424-26.
36 See G.L. Bach & Albert Ando, The Redistributional Effects of Inflation, 39 REv. ECON. &
STAT. 1, 1 (1957) (stating that leading economists hold that debtors gain while creditors
lose during inflation); Greider, supra note 1, at 15 (noting that creating greenback cur-
rency to finance public projects can lead to inflation). The notion that banks would hold
back from issuing currency rests on the assumption that banks, like other actors in the
private sector, have short-run perspectives relative to the perspectives of the Fed and other
governmental actors. The banks demonstrated the truth of this assumption in the afore-
mentioned lending practices that effected the most recent financial collapse. See Poole,
supra note 33, at 424-26 (arguing that ultimate blame lies with private banks because the
banks, not the federal government, engaged in the risky lending practices that contributed
to the financial crisis).
37 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2006) ("[The Federal Reserve] shall maintain long run growth of
the monetary and credit aggregates .. . to promote effectively the goals of maximum em-
ployment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.").
38 See, e.g., Greider, supra note 1, at 14-15 (arguing that Congress should have greater
control over the Fed and should restrain the Fed's power to set monetary policy).
39 See id. at 13-15.
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reign in the Fed's inconsistent practices and augment Americans'
sense of its legitimacy as a governmental instrument, but in practice it
is unlikely to bear its promised fruit.
Indeed, democratic interference in monetary policy making, like
the privatization solution above, is highly problematic. Few members
of Congress have educational backgrounds in economics, and fewer
still have expertise in that field.40 Of course, Congress is free to con-
sult those who do have such expertise, but it is under no obligation to
either solicit that advice or heed it.41 Moreover, in a significantly po-
larized political climate,42 a Congress vested with authority over mone-
tary policy would be unlikely to agree on the content and wisdom of
that power, resulting either in a monetary policy so haphazard as to be
counterproductive or in a profound and injurious lack of policy in
this area. Even if it were able to agree on comprehensive monetary
policy prescriptions, Congress's glacial pace of action would frustrate
any beneficial effects of monetary policy,4 3 which depends on the ac-
curacy-and thus timeliness-of the data on which it relies.44
As a more general matter, central banks most effectively combat
inflation (and thus successfully champion economic stability and
growth sustainability) when they are independent of the political
branches of their national governments. 45 Nations that substantially
insulate their central banks' structures and operations from the politi-
cal process show statistically significant lower rates of inflation than do
40 See Most Lawmakers Don't Have Economic Education, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Oct. 1, 2008,
3:54 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2008/10/01/most-lawmakers-dont-have-
economic-education/ (stating that 6.7% of members of Congress have economics degrees
and 14% have degrees related to economics).
41 Cf Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group-Based, Approach to
Lobbying Regulation, 58 AL. L. REv. 513, 530-33 (2007) (stating that lobbyists frequently act
as experts to members of Congress).
42 See generally ALAN I. ABRAMowiTz, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER: ENGAGED CITIZENS, PO-
LARIZATION, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2010) (describing the acute polarization in various
aspects of American politics).
43 See Barry Friedman & Andrew D. Martin, Op-Ed., A One-Track Senate, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2010, at A27 (describing how "endless negotiations" have bogged down major
legislative initiatives in the Senate).
44 The Fed has research departments tasked with "analyz[ing] literally thousands of
data series from disparate sources," and yet the incorporation of larger data sets would still
improve forecast accuracy. Ben S. Bernanke & Jean Boivin, Monetary Policy in a Data-Rich
Environment, 50 J. MONETARY ECON. 525, 525-26, 544-45 (2003). Congress could not
match the Fed's resources and expertise in analyzing this economic data without signifi-
cant expenditures.
45 See Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger & Jakob de Haan, The Political Economy of Central-Bank
Independence 54 (Princeton Special Papers in Int'l Econ., Paper No. 19, 1996), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/-ies/IES-SpecialPapers/SPl9.pdf ("[W]e must agree with
the theoretical literature and previous empirical studies that a country with an indepen-
dent central bank will, ceteris paribus, have a lower rate of inflation than will a country where
politicians can steer the central bank's policy.").
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nations with central banks that have little such insulation.46 This cor-
relation is due to the fact that elected politicians are unlikely to ap-
prove restrictions of the money supply during boom periods, as doing
so would appear "too conservative on the inflation front," resulting in
loss of elected office.47 Indeed, avoiding this kind of political influ-
ence is the main justification for central bank independence, for with-
out political independence in a democratic system, the Fed and other
central banks would be less able to effect the long-term economic sta-
bility that is their raison d'itre."
II
ANOTHER POssIBILITY
Neither privatization nor democratization is an ideal proposal to
implement, leaving a problem with no obvious solution. But by con-
sidering the criticisms of those proposals, it is possible to craft an an-
swer that avoids the proposals' downsides while addressing the
problems inherent in the modem Fed. Such an approach combines
the opposites of each criticism. That is, instead of eviscerating the Fed
by devolving its functions to the market, the United States could di-
vorce its structures and operations from the private sector; and in-
stead of "democratizing" the Fed by subjecting its decisions to
congressional or other political oversight, the United States could
maintain the wall of separation that currently exists between the Fed
and the American political landscape, perhaps even supplementing
that wall to eliminate structural inconsistency. This Neutral Road
would in effect harmonize the nature of the Fed's relationships with
all outside forces, subjecting both politicians and private sector actors
to the same rigid rules of independence when dealing with the Fed
and its agents.
Implementing these two channels of the Neutral Road requires
legislation amending the Federal Reserve Act to create a Fed indepen-
dent of private and political influence. In legislating here, Congress
would act as a watchmaker God to the Fed's universe 49-that is, Con-
gress would pass legislation that complies with the Neutral Road's pre-
46 Alberto Alesina & Lawrence H. Summers, Central Bank Independence and
Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence, 25 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 151,
154 (1993).
47 See id. at 151-52.
48 See id. at 152 ("[A]n independent central bank that is free from political pressure
may behave more predictably, promoting economic stability. . . ."); Mission, supra note 2.
49 This analogy characterizes Deism's conception of the divine. For the most famous
discussion of this analogy, see generally WILLIAM PALEY, NATURAL THEOLOMv OR, Evi-
DENCES OF THE EXISTENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY, COLLECTED FROM THE APPEAR-
ANCES OF NATURE (Boston, Gould, Kendall & Lincoln 1841) (stating that the universe is too
complex to be without a designer).
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scriptions and thereafter remove itself (per the statute it passes) from
the Fed's decision making and operation.
A. Independence from the Private Sector
The first component of the amending legislation-under which
the Fed would act independently of the banks that now serve as much
of the institution's policy-making constituency5s-would assert that
the significant influence that large private financial institutions cur-
rently exert over the Fed is in part responsible for both its ad hoc
monetary and lending policies, and its permissive attitude toward and
resigned acceptance of private financial institutions' risky behavior.
The Neutral Road therefore prescribes elimination of private influ-
ence through a structural separation whose mechanisms this Note will
discuss later.5 1 The benefits of such a separation are myriad, but the
ultimate aim is to center Fed policy on achieving a result that com-
ports with the Fed's ultimate goal: maximizing national economic sta-
bility.5 2 Pursuit of this goal necessitates a shift away from profit
maximization as a policy focus, which, as discussed earlier, varies be-
tween tangential to and divergent from what ought to be the Fed's
goal.53 Because the incentives that motivate the private sector are
often inconsistent with those that should drive the Fed's policy mak-
ing,54 the United States should not allow such incentives to infect one
of the federal government's most powerful institutions. The Neutral
Road therefore proposes that the Fed limit profit motivation by sepa-
rating from the private sector.
A natural objection to this line of reasoning argues that because
private financial institutions are a significant component of the na-
tion's economy55 and their deposits constitute a relatively significant
proportion of the Fed's liabilities,56 the Fed should hear and consider
those institutions' counsel prior to implementing policy. But this ob-
jection errs on two grounds. First, it ignores the profit motivation that
infects the reasoning and advice the private financial institutions57
50 See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
51 See infra Part III.
52 See 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2006). By national economic stability, I mean maximization
of the Fed's tripartite goal of "maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-
term interest rates." Id.
53 See supra Part I.B.1.
54 See supra Part I.B.1.
55 See Eduardo Porter, The Modest Worth of Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2012, at BI
("Value added by the financial industry, its direct contribution to the economy, topped
$1.2 trillion in 2011, according to government statistics.").
56 See Bo. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., MONETARY POucy REPORT TO THE
CONGREss 28-30 (2012), availabk at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/
20120229_mprfullreport.pdf.
57 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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give and thus conflates these institutions' self-centered profit seeking
with the pursuit of broader economic stability that should be the Fed's
central goal. In other words, what is good for these institutions is not
necessarily good for society as a whole. Second, the objection incor-
rectly relies on the idea that the mere fact that private financial insti-
tutions deposit significant sums into the Fed's coffers58 means that
they deserve a say in the Fed's course of action because the Fed will
utilize those deposits in implementing policy. This reasoning con-
flates shareholders with customers. Those who deposit money in an
account with a commercial bank are not shareholders of that bank;
they are its customers.*9 The private financial institutions that deposit
funds with the Fed should have no more de jure right to influence
Fed policy than commercial bank customers have to influence private
bank operations.
Thus, there is no reason that such institutions should have, by
right, any influence over the Fed's structures or policy making. In-
deed, such influence, because of its source, is inherently biased, bring-
ing it into conflict with what ought to be, and what ostensibly is, the
central policy goal of the Fed: the maximization of economic stability.
B. Political Independence
The political independence of the Fed is equally, if not more,
important than its independence from private sector influence. As
discussed above,60 central banks generally operate more effectively
when fully insulated from the political branches of government.6 1
Moreover, Congress lacks the skills and efficiency to decide and imple-
ment monetary policy in an effective and timely manner.62 For these
reasons, the United States should maintain the Fed's current wall of
separation from Congress and its agents.
A natural objection to separating the Fed from the political pro-
cess stems from the worry that an institution so far outside the control
of the legislature or elected government more generally would lack
both legitimacy and restraint, accumulating and retaining virtually un-
limited power for itself. This worry, however, ignores both historical
58 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs., supra note 56, at 28-30.
59 See, e.g., Donald R. Hodgman, The Deposit Relationship and Commercial Bank Invest-
ment Behavior, 43 REV. ECON. & STAT. 257, 257 (1961) (referring to those who deposit in
commercial banks as customers, not shareholders).
60 See supra Part 1.B.2.
61 See Eijffinger & de Haan, supra note 45, at 54. But cf Alesina & Summers, supra
note 46, at 159 ("[R]esults [of empirical studies] suggest that ... central bank indepen-
dence reduces the level and variability of inflation but does not have either large benefits
or costs in terms of real macroeconomic performance. This observation represents at least
a fragment of evidence in support of theories emphasizing the neutrality of money.").
62 See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
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evidence and judicial controls over the Fed's exercise of power. The
Fed has not seized unchecked control over the nation's finances.63 It
has not sought to circumvent the checks on its own power included in
its organic statute; in fact, it has bowed to congressional and presiden-
tial pressures several times throughout its history.64 Moreover, 12
U.S.C. § 1848 provides that any party aggrieved by the Board of Gover-
nors may obtain review in a circuit court of the United States. 65 Fi-
nally, if the Fed took action that clearly exceeded the bounds of its
organic statute, federal courts would invalidate that action.66
These checks, combined with the Fed's historical respect for the
attitudes and shifting loyalties of the political branches, militate
against the realism of a slippery slope argument as applied to the Fed.
Moreover, the evidence that political independence creates a more
effective central bank is sufficiently strong to overcome an ill-founded
worry that the Fed will continually seek and retain power for itself.
Thus, in practice, the benefits of political independence far outweigh
its illusory drawbacks.
All of the above arguments taken together indicate that a Fed
independent of both private sector actors (specifically the banks and
other private financial institutions that currently exert significant in-
fluence over the Fed's operations) and the American political land-
scape-that is, a Fed divorced from the vacillating majorities in
Congress and insulated from the will of the American electorate more
generally-will both avoid the problems that critics raise concerning
the modern Fed's policy making and operations and will create a Fed
that is more effective in achieving its tripartite goal.
III
IMPLEMENTATION
Having established that the Fed's independence from both the
private sector and the political sphere is a good idea, the next step is
to find mechanisms to implement the Neutral Road's channels effec-
63 Rather than acting independently, the Fed has demonstrated compliance with
pressure from the political branches. See generally Boettke & Smith, supra note 7 (detailing
the Fed's compliance with political pressure throughout its history).
64 See id. at 13.
65 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (2006); seeJones v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 79
F.3d 1168, 1170-71 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
66 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984) ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress."). Of course, for courts to overturn Fed action, Congress's intent, as expressed
in the Federal Reserve Act's language, must be clear. See id. Thus, Congress, in amending
the statute to comport with the Neutral Road, should carefully limit the Fed's powers
outside of its role as the national bank. The exact language of such careful drafting, how-
ever, is outside the scope of this Note and is better placed with administrative law experts.
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tively and without unintended negative externalities. While the wall
that separates Fed policy making from the political landscape is al-
ready significant relative to such barriers in other countries,6 7 the Fed
has virtually no separation from the private sector, which constitutes a
significant and influential part of the institution's governing and pol-
icy-making organs.68 This is the problem that requires an answer.
In providing that answer, the Neutral Road applies its tenets to
both aspects of the Fed's independence, despite the Fed's preexisting
insulation from political influence.69 The first justification for such an
approach stems from the fact that the mechanisms constituting this
proposal would change little in the relationship between the Fed and
the political branches. Indeed, the mechanisms that this approach
adopts operate with most force on the relationship between the Fed
and the private sector and do relatively little to affect political influ-
ence. The second justification for this approach is a harmonizing
one-that is, applying the Neutral Road to all actors outside the Fed is
more efficient in operation by virtue of its simplicity and provides Fed
and non-Fed actors clear guidelines for their interactions with each
other. This harmony also facilitates judicial review (where it is availa-
ble) by providing courts with rules that apply to all relevant parties
engaged in cross-barrier communications.7 0 These dual justifications
guide the Neutral Road's implementation of the particular type of
policies it prescribes.
Thus, with the general scope of the Neutral Road's mechanisms
in place, the following sections of this Note turn to the mechanisms
themselves. Each will be taken in turn, starting with structural altera-
tions to the Fed's organic statute, moving to impermissible contacts,
discussing the establishment of meritocratic structures, and ending
with transparency.
67 See, e.g., Alesina & Summers, supra note 46, at 155 fig.la (indicating that the U.S.
central bank's degree of independence is higher than most other developed countries
except Germany and Switzerland).
68 See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
69 See McDonough, supra note 8, at 4-6 (defending the structure and supervision of
the Fed and arguing that such structure and supervision allow the Fed "to meet its mone-
tary policy responsibilities and contain or forestall crises"). For an examination of the
relative effectiveness of the political independence-creating mechanisms in the Federal Re-
serve Act in practice, see generally Vittorio Grilli et al, Political and Monetaiy Institutions and
Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries, 6 ECON. POL'Y 341 (1991) (stating the
positive effects of an independent central bank on inflation and budgetary control).
70 The efficiency that this justification references is that the harmony provides Fed
actors, relevant outside actors, and courts with bright-line rules to determine what is and
what is not permissible. In so doing, it collapses analysis to a single set of actors operating
under a single set of rules.
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A. The Current Structures
The structures that now govern Fed policy intimately combine
politics and the private sector with Fed decision making,7' eviscerating
much of the "independence" that the Fed should have. To create a
truly independent Fed, the United States must alter these structures to
eliminate private sector participation and remove Congress's political
appointment power. 72
The Federal Reserve Act weaves private sector actors into the
Fed's policy-making bodies.73 As discussed earlier,74 many of the most
powerful Fed structures-including the Board of Governors, the Fed-
eral Open Market Committee, and the Federal Reserve Banks-incor-
porate private sector representatives.7 5 To eliminate the influence
that those representatives wield over Fed policy, Congress must bar
current employees of substantially related private sector institutions
from filling positions of power in the Fed. Additionally, Congress
must eliminate those positions on each of the governing bodies that
are reserved for representatives of member banks. These measures
will at least eliminate the private sector's direct influence over Fed
policy. Similarly, to eliminate politicians' structural influence, the
United States should abolish the President's appointment and Con-
gress's approval powers over Fed positions.76 Doing so will prevent
Fed policy that is beholden to a particular political interest and thus
divorce, at least structurally, politics from the Fed.
Taken together, these measures will eliminate much of the pri-
vate and political influence over Fed policy-making structures, but
they will leave behind a policy-maker void that will require correction.
B. Meritocracy
Once Congress abrogates the provisions of the Federal Reserve
Act that facilitate outside actors' influence over Fed policy, the United
States must seek suitable replacements for the structures that those
provisions originally established. This challenge leads to the ideas
and structures associated with meritocracy. "Meritocracy," a term
coined by Michael Young in the mid-twentieth century,77 commonly
71 See supra Part I.A.
72 1 use the term "exercises" loosely. As of this writing, two vacancies exist on the
Fed's Board of Governors because Congress has failed, until recently, even to discuss the
President's nominees to fill those vacancies. See Annie Lowrey, 2 Federal Reserve Nominees
Make It to a Confirmation Hearing, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 21, 2012, at B3.
73 See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
74 See supra Part I.B.
75 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
76 See 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2006).
7 See Amartya Sen, Merit and justice, in MERITOCRACY AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 5, 7
(Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 2000). Young is critical of meritocracy; one source describes
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describes a system that assigns appointments and responsibilities to
individuals based on merits, which generally include intelligence and
ability.78 The Neutral Road proposes the use of meritocratic princi-
ples at two levels: selection and placement. In this structure, the Fed
would consist of a permanent bureaucracy selected through a set of
threshold criteria. The members of that bureaucracy would then be
subject to automatic promotion and demotion based on performance
and experience.
1. The Bureaucracy
The benefits of a permanent bureaucracy in control of the Fed
are myriad,79 but for purposes of the Neutral Road, the relevant ad-
vantages of such a bureaucracy are its independence and
effectiveness.
If well crafted through careful application of selection and place-
ment mechanisms,80 a permanent bureaucracy in the Fed can avoid
the problems associated with current Fed operations while creating an
institution that maximizes its positive policy impacts. In conjunction
with rules both barring communication with outsiders8 ' and ensuring
public knowledge of a bureaucrat's actions,82 bureaucrats well
grounded in theoretical and practical monetary policy knowledge
with strong incentives to advance within the structure of the Fed8 3 will
seek to fulfill their duties in ways that maximize their candidacy for
higher positions. 4 And because such advancement will depend on
the success of their decisions as applied to the real world rather than
his definition of meritocracy as a system in which "merit is equated with intelligence-plus-
effort, its possessors are identified at an early age and selected for an appropriate intensive
education, and there is an obsession with quantification, test-scoring, and qualifications."
Id. (quoting THE FONTANA DICTIONARY OF MODERN THOUGHT 521 (Alan Bullock et al. eds.,
2d ed. 1988)). This definition differs somewhat from the broader modern definition. See,
e.g., Thomas B. Hoffer, Meritocracy, in EDUCATION AND SOCIOLoGY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 435,
435 (David L. Levinson et al. eds., 2002) ("Etymologically, meritocracy means 'rule by
merit' . . . . Meritocracy entails that those with power and authority hold their positions by
virtue of their ostensible ability to do the job at least as well as any contenders.").
78 See Hoffer, supra note 77, at 436.
79 For an exploration of those benefits, see Kenneth J. Meier, Bureaucracy and Democ-
racy: The Case for More Bureaucracy and Less Democracy, 57 PuB. ADmiN. REv. 193, 195-97
(1997) (arguing that bureaucratic institutions will perform more optimally if they are more
independent of the elected branches of government).
80 See infra Part III.B.
81 See infra Part III.C.
82 See infra Part III.D.
83 See infra Part IlI.B.
84 See, e.g., Sen, supra note 77, at 8 ("[T]he idea of merits in this instrumental perspec-
tive relates to the motivation of producing better results. In this view, actions are meritori-
ous in a derivative and contingent way, depending on the good they do, and more
particularly the good that can be brought about by rewarding them.").
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outside political advancement or remuneration,8 5 the Fed at an aggre-
gate level will automatically select the best actors to decide and imple-
ment the most effective Fed policy.
2. Selection
Selection of this bureaucracy's members would depend on sev-
eral criteria, including educational credentials, practical experience,
and performance on objective tests. These measures would serve as
threshold requirements for entry into the Fed's permanent bureau-
cracy and would form a composite measure-rather than a check-
list-of a candidate's suitability for entry. In this way, the Fed will
select candidates with diverse strengths and backgrounds to be part of
its operations and policy-making structures, resulting in a broader and
deeper pool from which to choose the most effective policies.86 With
this consideration in mind, a per se bar on candidates formerly of the
private sector is ill-advised. However, the revolving door between the
private sector and the Fed should be limited. Like other revolving
door policies in the federal government, 7 Congress should imple-
ment a limitation on movement between the Fed and substantially re-
lated88 outside positions by means of a time period before which that
movement is barred. For instance, if a Fed employee receives and ac-
cepts an offer from a private financial institution for a position deal-
ing with the institution's compliance with Fed policy, that employee
must find other employment that is not substantially related to the
Fed's policies for a certain period of time before taking up the work of
that position.89 The reverse scenario (i.e., a private employee seeking
to enter the Fed bureaucracy), however, should not warrant applica-
tion of a time limitation. The United States wants to encourage
skilled and experienced candidates to apply for membership in the
Fed bureaucracy, and the time bar applicable on exit from the Fed, in
85 See infra Part 1II.B.
86 See Meier, supra note 79, at 195 ("[T]he use of merit-oriented procedures, and the
ability to exploit economies of scale mean that bureaucracies become storehouses of ex-
pertise. They can learn over time . . . and hire or contract for needed expertise.").
87 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4673, 4674-76 (Jan. 26, 2009)
(prohibiting executive-agency appointees from participating in matters related to former
employment for a period of two years from the date of appointment and, upon leaving an
appointed executive position, from lobbying executive branch officials for the rest of the
administration's term).
88 Determination of whether one position is "substantially related" to another should
be left to courts, and a cause of action should be vested in taxpayers, allowing both watch-
dog groups and U.S. Attorneys General to bring suit in federal court for perceived viola-
tions of the rule.
89 The length of this time might be based on a sliding scale that varies with the relat-
edness of the two positions. Regardless, it should be at minimum one year in order to




combination with the bar on outside contacts,90 will be sufficient to
prevent outside actors from moving back and forth between the Fed
and private institutions with the goal of influencing Fed policy.
A merit-based system that encourages diversity among members,
coupled with the prohibition on a quickly revolving door between the
Fed and related outside positions, will yield the most effective combi-
nation of Fed policies. This approach allows input from individuals
with different backgrounds, all seeking--with the help of advance-
ment incentives-to maximize national economic stability in each Fed
policy decision. In other words, broadening the input in terms of pol-
icy suggestions while limiting that input to ideas that seek to forward
the Fed's goals will result in a pool of possible policies that is not only
broad and deep, but also motivationally well founded. There are,
however, potential problems with this approach.
The central problem and most significant criticism of using mer-
itocratic principles in selecting Fed actors concerns the validity of the
mechanisms by which those in power evaluate the variables that deter-
mine merit 9 1-that is, how does one test the intelligence, educational
credentials, and ability of an individual seeking to become a member
of the Fed bureaucracy? Additionally, there is a problem with access:
some applicants, because of lack of resources, prejudice, or other so-
cioeconomic forces, cannot acquire the necessary credentials and abil-
ities to compete with those who can acquire such prerequisites.9 2
Ideally, this system selects candidates well suited for the Fed and
results in an institution that functions more efficiently and with
greater effectiveness. Selection based on merit, as critics suggest,93 is
somewhat problematic, but if properly implemented, it is neither im-
possible nor inaccurate. For positions at the Fed, significant educa-
tional backgrounds in economics generally and in monetary policy
and bank regulation specifically should be requisite, and they are eas-
ily verifiable. The risk inherent in attempting to measure the intelli-
gence and ability of a candidate is greater, and that process is perhaps
more difficult, but these concerns can be reduced or eliminated with
sufficiently narrow tailoring of selection criteria. For instance, aca-
demic performance, along with the reputation of the academic insti-
90 See infta Part III.C.
91 See, e.g., Sen, supra note 77, at 5 ("[There is a] tendency, in practice, to characterize
'merit' in inflexible forms reflecting values and priorities of the past, often in sharp con-
flict with conceptions that would be needed for seeing merit in the context of contempo-
rary objectives and concerns.").
92 See, e.g., John E. Roemer, Equality of Opportunity, in MERITOCRACY AND EcoNoMIc
INEQUALITY, supra note 77, at 17, 20 ("We must distinguish between the circumstances be-
yond a child's control that influence her ability to process educational resources, and her




tution at which the applicant studied, serves as a sufficient proxy for
both intelligence and ability.94 Combining this index with an objec-
tive civil service test that preeminent economic scholars design would
mitigate, in large part, the dangers of relying wholly on the academic
performance and background of a candidate.95 Finally, reliance on a
candidate's practical, related experience further reduces the danger
that comes from relying solely on factors that do not encompass real-
world experiences.96 Moreover, the fact that none of these qualifica-
tions are part of a checklist-they are instead part of a composite in-
dex for potential in the bureaucracy-removes much of the danger
that candidates will represent an unnecessarily narrow cross section of
the available talent. Each of these factors taken together indicates
that the selection criteria issue is not as problematic as critics suggest.
The criticism concerning access, however, operates in two chan-
nels. The first and more general channel is a normative one: as a
powerful institution within the federal government, the Fed should do
its part to ensure that all those with the inherent talent to effectively
decide Fed policy have the chance to do so. 97 But the Fed should not
be used as a tool to increase underprivileged participation in policy
and should instead focus on its broad goal of maintaining economic
growth by setting monetary policy.98 To divert energy and money to-
ward increasing access would be to necessarily reduce the energy and
money spent to ensure that the economy is in the aggregate as stable
as possible.99
The second channel of the access concern argues that the Fed
should rely on mechanisms that fill its ranks with the best candidates
possible, pointing to those who, if educated, would perhaps surpass
94 Access to education in the first place, however, introduces problems with using
education as such a proxy. Those problems will be discussed shortly.
95 There is, of course, the question of who would select those preeminent economic
scholars. This is best left to the academy for determination-that is, associations of econo-
mists, such as the American Economic Association, should create the exam. Utilizing these
groups of professional economists to design these exams both draws from a deep pool of
expertise and accounts for the differences of opinion that accompany any organization of
experts.
96 This is not to say that academic instruction has no value in real-world practice, but
practical knowledge should be considered in selection of the bureaucracy in order to blunt
the development of a group of policy makers who possess nondiverse traits.
97 See, e.g., PREETI VissA & DIVYA SUNDAR, THE GREENLINING INST., GOVERNMENT THAT
LOOKs LIKE AMERICA? RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIvERsrIV IN FINANCIAL REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS
1, 6 (2012), available at http://greenlining.org/resources/pdfs/OMWIforGIwebsite.pdf
(arguing that diverse backgrounds strengthen institutional performance and that a demo-
cratic government should represent the diversity of its citizenry).
98 See 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2006).
99 See Roemer, supra note 92, at 25, 29-31 (discussing the "equality-efficiency trade-
off" and arguing that opportunities to develop talent ought to be provided to underprivi-
leged students in the educational setting but not to underprivileged adults in the job-seek-
ing setting where efficiency concerns are given additional weight).
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their already educated counterparts in terms of effectiveness as Fed
policy makers. This suggestion, however, is unrealistic. It is hard to
imagine a mechanism that, without significant commitment of re-
sources, could select from among hundreds of millions of lay individu-
als those with inherent talent. Even if such a mechanism existed,
further commitment of resources would be needed to educate the in-
dividuals selected as a result of that mechanism. Given the near im-
possibility of implementing a solution to this channel of the access
concern, the Fed should focus on retaining the best of the talent that
is already available.
Thus, these proposed selection criteria effectively act as a thresh-
old for entry into the Fed bureaucracy, avoid problems associated with
biased qualifying conditions, and broaden access insofar as that goal is
practicable.
3. Placement
Once the bureaucracy is available, the Fed must distribute indi-
viduals among its positions according to their abilities. To create the
most effective Fed possible, the institution should reward those whose
policy choices result in economic stability and disincentivize policies
that lead to and exacerbate situations like the 2008 financial col-
lapse.10" Such mechanisms would operate automatically and would
depend on outside economic data from non-Fed groups, such as the
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 1' and nongovernmental groups of
academics. 102 Policies that are successful in both combating inflation
and preventing economic instability will reward their creators with ad-
vancement in the Fed bureaucracy or continuance in a high-level posi-
tion. Policies that are unsuccessful in combating inflation and
preventing economic instability will result in their creators' demotion
or forced exit from the bureaucracy.
Determining the exact criteria by which these mechanisms of ad-
vancement, demotion, and forced exit operate is somewhat problem-
atic but not insurmountable. The results of policies that fail to
combat inflation are obvious in the quantitative data and are suscepti-
ble to numerical thresholds. For instance, a policy that results in no
more than three percent annual inflation might be deemed success-
ful. Exact determination of that number in these types of thresholds
should be left to Congress. For policies with less obvious results in
economic data-like the Fed's failure to sufficiently supervise banks
100 See Poole, supra note 33, at 422-26.
101 See Mission, Vision, and Values, U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE BuREAu ECoN. ANALYsis, http:/
/www.bea.gov/about/mission.htm (last updated May 23, 2011).
102 I refer here to groups such as the American Economic Association.
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that contributed to the 2008 crisis' severity 03-courts are well situated
to hear evidence and determine whether a link between a particular
policy and a negative economic consequence is sufficient to warrant
demotion of a Fed bureaucrat.104 Brought by citizens who disagree
with Fed bureaucrats' policy choices, suits such as these would have
two advantages: they would check the aggregation of power in individ-
uals who do not create effective Fed policy and they would give non-
Fed actors a forum in which to voice their disapproval of Fed policy
choices. Taken together, automatic mechanisms and suits against Fed
officials would effectively govern upward and downward movement in
the Fed bureaucracy and would narrow Fed policy makers to those
who create effective policy.
Of course, at lower levels, the Fed cannot premise advancement
or demotion on success or failure of policy choices because lower-level
Fed bureaucrats likely will not make such choices. 05 As a substitute,
the Fed should base vertical movement on a seniority system for posi-
tions in which bureaucrats do not directly make policy. This system
would serve a number of functions. First, it would insulate Fed policy
making from individuals who have recently transitioned from private
or political positions, thus limiting the influence of both spheres on
Fed policy. Second, a seniority system would preference experience
in the workings of the Fed and its impacts on economic realities over
purely theoretical knowledge, creating Fed policy makers who have a
grasp of both the theory and the practical impacts of that theory. Fi-
nally, this structure would reward bureaucrats who demonstrate long-
term loyalty to the Fed and would insulate policy making from those
who have other motivations, such as political advancement.
At the outset, the Fed must choose policy makers for the first iter-
ation of this system. To make this choice, the institution should look
to available Fed bureaucrats who were not politically appointed and
choose the longest-serving bureaucrats to fill policy-making positions.
103 See Poole, supra note 33, at 424-26.
104 These suits would seek injunctive relief-that is, the demotion of those Fed policy
makers whose policies do not result in economic stability. In order to deal with these
claims and avoid a floodgates problem for federal courts, it might be advantageous to
institute an administrative adjudication system, like those in other federal agencies such as
the Social Security Administration. See Information About Social Security's Hearings and Ap-
peals Process, Soc. SECURYY ONLINE, http://ssa.gov/appeals/ (last updated Nov. 13, 2012).
Such a solution, however, would require that citizens have standing to bring such suits,
which, while somewhat problematic in terms of current Supreme Court jurisprudence, is
outside the scope of this Note. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 557-59,
578 (1992) (holding that wildlife conservationists and environmental groups lacked stand-
ing to challenge the Endangered Species Act of 1973's division of power).
105 See Federal Open Madret Committee, BoARD GovERNORs FED. REs. SYs., http://
www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc.htm (last updated May 30, 2012) (describ-
ing how the seven-member Board of Governors and the twelve-member Federal Open Mar-
ket Committee make the Fed's policy decisions).
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These individuals would then be subject to the review described above
and held responsible for the consequences, negative or positive, of the
policies that they create. Other methods, such as political appoint-
ments or maintaining the current occupants of the policy-making po-
sitions, fail to avoid political and private influence, as many of those
occupants were politically appointed or were private sector
employees. 106
Having addressed each of the problems with a meritocratic sys-
tem, the advantages of its use in the Fed are apparent. In that con-
text, the problems with selection and placement of a bureaucracy in a
meritocratic system do not pose so high an obstacle as to preclude
their use. Moreover, that system results in a Fed that is more effective
and more independent of both the private and political sectors.
C. Impermissible Contacts
To ensure that outside actors no longer exert influence over the
Fed's operations, Congress must prevent contact between outside ac-
tors and Fed officials. The most straightforward way to implement
such a separation is through prohibition on those contacts. The clos-
est analogy to this type of mechanism in existing law is the ban on ex
parte communications that prevents a federal agency's officials from
communicating with individuals and groups outside the agency.
Federal agencies under the Administrative Procedure Act (the
APA) 0 7 are subject to a ban on undisclosed ex parte communications
with an "interested person" when those agencies adjudicate. 08 "Inter-
ested person" refers not only to private sector actors that have a stake
in an agency decision, 109 but also "public officials,"1o such as the Pres-
106 See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
107 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553-559, 701-706 (2006).
108 Id. § 557(d) (1). The Fed's monetary policy making fits more naturally into the
rulemaking category; Fed policy making affects a broad class of individuals (like rulemak-
ing) instead of resolving disputes between specific individuals in specific cases (like adjudi-
cation). See 73 C.J.S. Pub. Admin. Law & Procedure § 165 (2004) (detailing the differences
between "rulemaking" and "adjudication" in the context of the APA). But the APA's prohi-
bition on ex parte communications in the context of rulemaking is relatively weak and
subject to more confused jurisprudence than is a similar prohibition in the context of
adjudication. Thus, the APA's prohibition would not serve as a sufficiently rigorous prohi-
bition for the Fed. See, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543-49 (1978) (holding that agencies possess discretion in creating
their procedural rules but that agencies are subject to limited judicial review when they
exercise that discretion); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 477 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (holding that because "[p] rivate groups were not competing for a specific valua-
ble privilege," there was no violation of the bar on ex parte communications during the
rulemaking).
109 Prof'1 Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth. (PATCO Il), 685




ident and his staff. 1 ' An agency decision maker who receives or
makes a prohibited ex parte communication must fully disclose the
communication "on the public record of the proceeding."' 12 If the
decision maker fails to disclose the communication on the public re-
cord, federal courts will overturn the relevant agency decision only if
the communication "irrevocably tainted" the decision-making process,
making the agency's decision "unfair, either to an innocent party or to
the public interest that the agency was obliged to protect." 13
The APA's ban on ex parte communications in the context of
adjudication,' 14 while perhaps effective where an agency has relatively
limited powers and scope of operation, is insufficiently rigorous in the
context of the Fed, the powers of which are broad and widely sweep-
ing.115 The prohibition's basic attitude toward subject communica-
tions is directly applicable-that is, the law should prohibit Fed
officials from making or receiving communications from interested
persons during the course of decision making. However, the remedy
for violation of that ban in the Fed context cannot be merely public
disclosure, but should consist of mechanisms that create real and ef-
fective incentives for both outside parties and officials inside the Fed.
The remedies should be tailored to each type of outside party
and should differ in quality and quantity in order to maximize the
incentive to avoid contacts. For actors in the private sector, the ideal
remedy for engaging in unauthorized communications with Fed offi-
cials is a fine that varies according to the breadth and significance of
the communication. This fine should be sufficiently large so as to dis-
incentivize those communications as a general matter. Given the
levels of wealth concentrated in most private sector actors with a di-
rect interest in Fed policies, 16 the fines may need to be substantial.
Dealing with communications from congresspersons or the Presi-
dent is more problematic because to penalize members of either
111 See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534,
1544-45 (9th Cir. 1993).
112 See5 U.S.C. §557(d)(1)(C).
113 PATCOD, 685 F.2d at 564. To make such a determination, the United States Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in PATCO II suggested five possible considerations, includ-
ing "the gravity of the ex parte communications; whether the contacts may have influenced
the agency's ultimate decision; whether the party making the improper contacts benefited
from the agency's ultimate decision; whether the contents of the communications were
unknown to opposing parties, who therefore had no opportunity to respond; and whether
vacation of the agency's decision and remand for new proceedings would serve a useful
purpose." Id. at 564-65 (footnotes omitted).
114 See 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1).
115 See MELTZER, supra note 1, at 1.




branch raises serious constitutional issues.' 17 Subjecting such mem-
bers to suit for injunctive relief would perhaps be useful, but this too is
constitutionally problematic. 11 Removing the incentive for congress-
persons or the President to contact Fed officials thus seems to require
focusing not on the political branches, but on the Fed officials them-
selves-that is, once there is contact between outside parties and a
Fed official, that official should be screened from participation in the
relevant decision-making process. This mechanism would eliminate
the incentive for members of the political branches to engage in pro-
hibited contacts by minimizing the influence that the contacted Fed
official exerts. In other words, if contacted Fed officials cannot par-
ticipate in the decision about which they were contacted, political ac-
tors will have no reason to contact them in the first place.
All of the above would apply if an outsider contacted a Fed offi-
cial, but what if a Fed official initiated the contact? Under these cir-
cumstances, the incentive structure is more straightforward. Placing
the official's continued Fed employment in the line of fire will surely
curb incentives to engage in impermissible contacts. For contacts ini-
tiated without ill intent and where the contact is relatively insignifi-
cant, a Fed official's initiation of an impermissible contact should
result in screening of the now-conflicted official from relevant deci-
sions. For more significant contacts and contacts initiated with the
intent to profit or to otherwise influence Fed decisions for personal or
political gain, officials should be subject to termination and, in ex-
treme cases, fines and other criminal penalties. Instituting such a
stringent disciplinary scheme would serve both to disincentivize Fed
officials from initiating contacts and to eliminate from the Fed's oper-
ations those officials who operate under personal, rather than socie-
tal, motivation.
This rule cannot be absolute, but exceptions should be few and
far between. Among the rare exceptions should be regular reports to
Congress and provision of public information concerning the Fed's
actions and the purpose and effects of those actions, as the current
Federal Reserve Act mandates.119 A completely independent Fed will
need transparency, making this exception a necessary one. If the Fed
117 See 16 C.J.S. Const. Law § 215 (2005 & Supp. 2012). Constitutional problems arise
when a federal agency moves to restrict the actions of a branch of the federal government,
even where that agency's organic statute authorizes it to do so. Such restriction may, de-
pending on its degree, encroach on the spheres of influence in which each of the branches
is supreme and independent. See id.
118 See id. This type of suit also creates a constitutional problem, as the relief sought is
ajudicial order to members of the political branches to comply with a statutory rule. Such
an order differs from an order to comply with a constitutional rule and potentially im-
pinges on the separation of powers.
119 See 12 U.S.C. § 225b (2006).
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engages in opaque practices to the exclusion of outside analysis and
criticism, there is a real danger of capture by ideologues and rent-
seekers. While the meritocratic structures discussed in Part III.B
largely mitigate this worry, control over the Fed at the margins-that
is, in situations where the Fed clearly exceeds its statutory authority-
requires knowledge of Fed action on the part of those with the power
of macrocontrol: Congress by legislation, the President by executive
order, and the courts by judicial review. If that knowledge is unavaila-
ble and subject to public criticism, each branch will be without reason
or motivation to exercise its powers to prevent a runaway Fed.120
Other exceptions to a general rule preventing contacts between
outside actors and the Fed should be limited and carefully drafted to
avoid swallowing the rule in its entirety.
With these exceptions in mind, a rule limiting contacts between
Fed officials and outside actors would act to cement the Fed's inde-
pendence in decision making, thus ensuring that the institution takes
action divorced from both private profit motivations and swaying po-
litical agendas.
D. Transparency
Both the meritocratic system and a bar on impermissible contacts
require for their operation that all of the Fed's processes and constitu-
ents be open to public examination. By creating such transparency,
the United States can prevent both general aggregation of power in
the Fed and concentration of power in particular individuals within
the Fed.
To properly implement this transparency, the meritocracy's oper-
ations in terms of both its rules and its results must be open and avail-
able for public examination. Absent this transparency, citizens and
watchdog groups cannot bring suit, as violations of the system's con-
stituent structures are hidden. In this sense, the cost of monitoring is
simply too high unless transparency predominates. Likewise, Fed bu-
reaucrats must keep detailed records of their communications with
non-Fed actors and must make those records available to the public.
Otherwise, citizens and those that the Fed affects will not have availa-
ble to them the mechanisms that facilitate Fed compliance with con-
tact rules.
Thus, transparency is the last piece that, when combined with al-
teration of the old structures, a meritocratic permanent bureaucracy,
and a bar on impermissible outside communications, comprises the
Neutral Road.
120 Many, of course, may argue that the proposal presented here describes with preci-
sion a runaway Fed. By this term, I refer to a Fed that consolidates power to such a degree




Given how powerful an institution the Fed is, the problems inher-
ent in its operations significantly affect the economy. These problems
prevent the Fed from creating policy that effectively stabilizes the
economy and insulate Fed actors from the consequences of any insta-
bility that their policies create. 21
The solutions that critics propose create costs that outweigh their
benefits. Devolving Fed functions to the market implicates the mis-
alignment between profit motivation and the overarching goal of the
Fed's existence: to ease human suffering.122 Allowing politicians to
exercise control over Fed policy frustrates the institution's efficacy by
subjecting its policy making to perverse incentives and to processes
that simply move too slowly. 125
The proposal of this Note, the Neutral Road, would institute a
wall of separation between the Fed and outside actors. Free from
both political and private influence, the Fed would select policies that
maximize economic stability rather than profits or political gains.
124
To implement the Neutral Road, Congress should amend the
Federal Reserve Act to reflect that wall of separation. The amend-
ment should abrogate both political appointment powers and the Fed
structures that include private sector actors in policy-making posi-
tions,125 replace the current system of appointments with a mer-
itocracy that selects and encourages bureaucrats who demonstrate
effective policy-making skills,126 institute a bar on communications be-
tween Fed actors and those outside the Fed,127 and ensure that infor-
mation concerning the Fed's operations is open and available for
public scrutiny.'28
The United States' central bank must function as effectively as
possible. To do so, the Fed must operate independently from the pri-
vate sector and the political landscape. The Neutral Road offers a
blueprint for a Fed independent of both.
121 See supra Part I.
122 See supra Part I.A.
123 See supra Part 113.
124 See supra Part III.
125 See supra Part III.A.
126 See supra Part III.B.
127 See supra Part III.C.
128 See supra Part IIID.
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